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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] At the point where one of the most venerable principles of common
law and the reality of modern information management collide, even the
most diligent attorneys may become victims of the resulting fallout. The
attorney-client privilege2 is a bedrock principle of the common law,
1
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Mr. Kiker graduated magna cum laude and Order of the Coif from the University of
Michigan Law School in 1994, and is licensed to practice law in Arizona and Virginia.
His practice involves commercial and product liability litigation, with an emphasis on
litigation preparedness, electronic discovery, and trial practice. He would like to thank
Denis Riva, University of Richmond School of Law, Class of 2006, for his invaluable
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2
The attorney-client privilege attaches to a communication only if:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;
(2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member
of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a
fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the
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serving several important purposes. The privilege ensures that a client
seeking legal advice will be able to fully disclose the facts of her situation
to her attorney without fear of her confidences being used to her
disadvantage.3 Similarly, the client’s confidence in the confidentiality of
her communications ensures that her attorney will be equipped with all the
pertinent facts necessary to enable zealous representation and an effective
search for the truth.4 Yet the attorney’s responsibility to protect and
preserve that privilege is at great risk when confronted with the flood of
information contained on even small computer networks. As the volume
of information subject to discovery increases, the burden of reviewing that
information to segregate privileged communications also increases.
Unfortunately, absent a stipulation by the parties or court order to the
contrary, the timeframe within which to complete discovery remains
limited. At some point, as a result of limited time and resources, or the
presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i)
an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal
proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort;
and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950). This article is concerned with the very last element: waiver; specifically,
in the context of inadvertent disclosure in the course of discovery. In addition, I
will discuss waiver principles in connection with attorney-client privileged
information only. This is done with recognition that there are many other types
of privilege, such as the executive privilege, doctor-patient privilege, trade
secret privilege, etc., and that each may have its unique jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Roberta M. Harding, Waiver: A Comprehensive Analysis of a Consequence of
Inadvertently Producing Documents Protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege,
42 CATH. U. L. REV. 465, 482 n.84 (identifying various statutory privileges,
including the marital privilege, physician-patient privilege, priest-penitent
privilege and counselor-client privilege). However, “the privilege at issue
appears not to affect whether inadvertent disclosure constitutes a waiver.” John
T. Hundley, Annotation, Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent
Disclosure – Federal Law, 159 A.L.R. FED. 153. § 2a (2005). See also
Transamerica Computer Co. v. Int’l Bus. Mach., 573 F.2d 646, 648 n.1
(distinguishing between the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
“is unimportant . . . where the third person to whom the disclosure was made . . .
was [an] adversary in litigation”).
3
Jennifer A. Hardgrove, Note, Scope of Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege: Articulating
a Standard That Will Afford Guidance to Courts, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998).
4
Id.
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[2] The currently pending proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure recognize this risk and incorporate procedural protections
for what many are increasingly recognizing as the inevitable inadvertent
disclosure of privileged information.6 However, in many jurisdictions this
protection is ephemeral. The applicable substantive law, narrowly
circumscribing the privilege in favor of the search for truth that is the
purpose of our legal system, does not recognize an inadvertent disclosure
exception to the traditional principle that disclosure of privileged
information to a third party waives the privilege.7 In this article, I will
explore briefly the attorney-client privilege and the law regarding waiver
of that privilege, and examine the risks those principles create for lawyers
working in a world where even a routine production of documents in
response to discovery may capture hundreds of thousands, or even
millions, of individual communications. I will also examine the
procedural and ethical rules that attempt to address the problem, and
identify the shortcomings of each. Finally, I will recommend a uniform
treatment of inadvertent waiver issues, as well as a complementary
modification to the rules of ethics.
II. INFORMATION OVERLOAD
[3] Just how much information is out there? Researchers at the School for
Information Management and Systems of the University of California at
5

“Inadvertent,” by definition, means “unintentional.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 586 (10th ed. 1999). This article is concerned with the purely
inadvertent disclosure, rather than “an intentional or purposeful disclosure.” (Int’l
Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 446 (D. Mass. 1988)). Some
courts, however, view any disclosure, inadvertent or not, as voluntary.
6
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Agenda E-18 (hereinafter Judicial Conference Report), at 27
(Sept. 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf (“The problems that
can result from efforts to guard against privilege waiver often become more acute when
discovery of electronically stored information is sought”). See also Harding, supra note
2, at 466 n.3 (collecting cases “raising the issue of the waiver consequence of
inadvertently produced privileged documents”).
7
See John T. Hundley, Annotation, Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent
Disclosure – State Law, 51 A.L.R. 5th 603 (2004).
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Berkeley (SIMS) have undertaken to answer that question. The results are
staggering, requiring the use of descriptive terms foreign to even the
“advanced” personal computer user. In 2002, people created five exabytes
of new information, ninety-two percent of which was stored on magnetic
media, and the bulk of that was on hard disks.8 How big is an “exabyte?”
One exabyte is equal to 1,000,000,000,000,000,000, or 1018 bytes.9 Five
exabytes is “equivalent in size to the information contained in half a
million new libraries the size of the Library of Congress print
collections.”10 In fact, according to these researchers, five exabytes is
twenty-five times all the printed information in the world.11
[4] Numbers such as these are virtually beyond comprehension. It is
likely that the vast majority of the information being generated will never
be the subject of any form of discovery, certainly not in any individual
lawsuit. Nevertheless, even on a scale that litigants deal with everyday,
the volume of available information is incredible, and increasing at an
incredible rate.12 For example, a single CD-ROM can hold approximately
650 megabytes (MB) of information, or the amount of information
contained in over sixteen feet of shelved books.13 A single DVD can hold
4.3 gigabytes (GB), more than six times the content of a CD. An average
laptop computer, with a 40GB hard drive, could house enough information
Consider also the transformation of
to fill a small library!14
communication from print and oral methods to electronic. The U.S. Postal
Service is expected to deliver 212 billion pieces of mail in 2006.15 In
comparison, computer users sent approximately 31 billion e-mail

8

Peter Lyman and Hal R. Varian, How Much Information? 2003,
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/how-much-info-2003/execsum.htm (last visited on April
21, 2006).
9
Id. Exec. Summary, tbl.1.1.
10
Id. Exec. Summary, pt.I.
11
Id.
12
See Judicial Conference Report, supra note 6, at 22 (“Electronically stored information
is characterized by exponentially greater volume than hard-copy documents”).
13
Lyman and Varian, supra note 8 , Exec. Summary, tbl.1.1 (estimating that 100MB is
equivalent to one meter of shelved books).
14
Id. Exec. Summary, pt.III, D.
15
United States Postal Service Key Facts, Postal Facts 2006,
http://www.usps.com/communications/organization/postalfacts.htm (last visited April 21,
2006).
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messages every day in 2002, “a figure which [was] expected to double by
2006.”16
[5] While not all of the electronic information being generated is business
data likely to be subject to discovery in litigation, the volume of business
information potentially subject to discovery is stunning, and becomes
more so with each passing year.17 Moreover, most of that information is
stored electronically – between seventy and ninety-five percent,18 and “as
much as fifty percent of information generated by companies never gets
printed” on paper.19 This information explosion is reflected in the amount
of information being generated by the average business employee in the
United States. According to the researchers at SIMS, on a world-wide
basis the average person generates almost 800MB of information each
year.20 However, fifty percent of the information generated world-wide
that is stored on magnetic media (which, as noted above, accounts for
ninety-two percent of all information generated) is created in the United
States.21 Thus, the average person in the United States generated over
three gigabytes of information in 2002 alone.22

16

Lyman and Varian, supra note 8, Exec. Summary, pt.IV, C. See also David K. Isom,
Electronic Discovery Primer for Judges, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 n.72 and
accompanying text (asserting that “[o]ver three billion business e-mails . . . are sent each
day in the United States, most of which are archived”); Judicial Conference Report, supra
note 6, at 23 (“large organizations[] . . . receive 250 to 300 million e-mail messages
monthly”).
17
Judicial Conference Report, supra note 6, at 22-23 (“examples of such volume include
the capacity of large organizations’ computer networks to store information in terabytes,
each of which represents the equivalent of 500 million typewritten pages of plain text”).
18
Laura Catherine Daniel, Note, The Dubious Origins and Dangers of Clawback and
Quick-Peek Agreements: An Argument Against Their Codification in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663, 663 (2005).
19
Id. at 663-64.
20
Lyman and Varian, supra note 8.
21
Id.
22
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were 281,421,906 people living in the
United States as of April 1, 2000. U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 2000,
http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). As noted,
ninety-two percent of the five exabytes of information generated in 2002 existed on
magnetic media, and fifty percent of that information was created in the United States
(Lyman and Varian, supra note 8). According to the SIMS researchers, three gigabytes
of information would be equivalent to three pick-up trucks filled with books. Id.
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[6] Put in perspective then, attorneys in the United States should expect
that nearly every person having relevant knowledge of the issues in any
given lawsuit will have generated a significant amount of discoverable
information, and the majority of that information will be located on
computer systems rather than in file cabinets. As a result, the volume of
information that attorneys must review in the course of discovery is
increasing exponentially, while the statutory and rule-based time frames
for accomplishing that review are not. The inevitable result will be the
inadvertent production of privileged information.
III. TRADITIONAL WAIVER CONCEPTS
[7] To fully appreciate the impact of the ever-increasing volume of
discoverable information, one must first revisit the governing law
concerning waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client
privilege “dates back to the 16th century and is believed to be the oldest of
the confidential privileges known to the common law.”23 Its importance in
encouraging “full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients,”24 however, is “inconsistent with the general duty to disclose and
may impede the truth-seeking function” of the justice system.25 As a
result, the privilege is narrowly circumscribed and may be waived under
certain circumstances.26
[8] Of particular interest here is the inadvertent disclosure of privileged
communications in the course of discovery.27 Most federal and state
23

Alexander C. Black, Annotation, What Persons or Entities May Assert or Waive
Corporation’s Attorney-Client Privilege – Modern Cases, 28 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 2 (1995).
See also Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 645 (dating the attorney-client privilege to “the
reign of Elizabeth I”). Cf. Harding, supra note 2, at n.84 (“The attorney-client privilege
has its roots in Roman Law”).
24
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
25
Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 643.
26
Id. at 651-52.
27
A threshold issue in any such case is whether the disclosure was, in fact, inadvertent.
This is a question of fact that must be decided on a case-by-case basis, but, in the
circumstances under consideration here, disclosure in the course of discovery as part of
the production of a large volume of predominantly electronically-stored information, the
inadvertence of the disclosure is not likely to be a significant issue. See Judicial
Conference Report, supra note 6, at 27 (“The volume of the information and the forms in
which it is stored may make privilege determinations more difficult and privilege review
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courts generally follow one of three approaches to the problem, although
some state courts follow a fourth.28
A. STRICT LIABILITY
[9] The simplest approach to dealing with the inadvertent waiver of
privileged information is the strict liability or per se approach.29 Under
this approach “all inadvertent disclosures that arise as a result of
negligence constitute a waiver.”30 The rationale behind the strict liability
approach is two-fold. First, since the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to protect confidential communications, once a communication
has been disclosed to a third party it is, by definition, no longer
confidential.31 In other words, after the confidential information has been
disclosed, “‘the bell has already rung, and the court cannot . . . unring it . .
. .’”32 Second, because the existence of the privilege depends in part on
the parties’ effort to maintain the confidence, some courts are reluctant to
grant “greater protection to those who assert the privilege than their own

correspondingly more expensive and time-consuming, yet less likely to detect all
privileged information. Inadvertent production is increasingly likely to occur.”).
28
See generally Hundley, supra note 7.
29
Jason C. Seewer, Pressure on Corporate America: The Appropriateness of a Per Se
Rule for Waiver of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1041,
1044 (2004).
30
Anne G. Bruckner-Harvey, Inadvertent Disclosure in the Age of Fax Machines: Is the
Cat Really Out of the Bag?, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 385, 388 (1994).
31
Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 649 (“The requirement that the communication be
‘confidential’ is strictly applied in that the existence of the attorney-client relationship
does not by itself raise a presumption of confidentiality. This element requires that
confidentiality be intended by the attorney and client, and the precautions taken by the
parties to ensure confidentiality may be considered as bearing on intent.”).
32
Harmony Gold U.S.A. Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 118 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(quoting Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 183 (N.D. Cal. 1990)). In
Harmony Gold, the court adopted the strict liability approach, but noted that the same
conclusion would have resulted had it applied the multi-factor test applied by the court in
Bud Antle. See also Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 811 (1990) (denying motion requesting return of inadvertently disclosed work
product because “granting the motion would do no more than seal the bag from which the
cat has already escaped”).
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precautions warrant.”33 Thus under the per se approach any disclosure,
voluntary or otherwise, waives the privilege.
[10] Perhaps the most often cited case applying the strict liability
approach is In re: Sealed Case, in which the court relied on the second
rationale for the per se rule – that parties should not be protected from
their own negligence. 34 In that case, a government contractor was under
investigation by a grand jury for tax evasion and fraud. During the course
of the investigation, the grand jury issued a subpoena for documents
related to certain adjustments made to the company’s books. The
company withheld from the production six documents it claimed were
exempt from disclosure as privileged attorney-client communications.35
The district court granted the government’s motion to compel production
of the documents, but the company continued to refuse and was held in
contempt.36 While the contempt order was on appeal, the government
learned that one of the documents had been disclosed to a different
government agency during a routine audit of travel expenses, and
contended that any privilege had been waived as a result of that
disclosure.37 The company, however, contended that the disclosure had
been “‘a bureaucratic error.’”38 Noting that the district court had
determined that the disclosure was voluntary, the D.C. Circuit wrote that it
did not matter “whether the waiver is labeled ‘voluntary’ or
33

In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Although the attorney-client
privilege is of ancient lineage and continuing importance, the confidentiality of
communications covered by the privilege must be jealously guarded by the holder of the
privilege lest it be waived.”). See also Int’l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp.
120 F.R.D. 445, 450 (quoting In re Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp. 77 B.R. 324, 330 (1987)
(“‘inadvertence is, after all, merely a euphemism for negligence, and, certainly . . . one is
expected to pay a price for one’s negligence’”) (omission in original).
34
In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (1989). See also Buckner-Harvey, supra note 30, at
389. For examples of sources citing In re Sealed Case see, e.g., Daniel, supra note 18 at
674-675; Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 657, n.107; Harding, supra note 2 at 472 n.21;
Hundly, supra note 2, at §§ 3a, 8, 16(b)-(c); Gloria A. Kristopek, Note, To Peek or Not to
Peek: Inadvertent or Unsolicited Disclosure of Documents to Opposing Counsel, 33 VAL.
U. L. REV. 643, 654 n.57 (1999); Amy M. Fulmer Stevenson, Comment, Making a Wrong
Turn on the Information Superhighway: Electronic Mail, the Attorney-Client Privilege
and Inadvertent Disclosure, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 347, 360 n.91 (1997).
35
In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 977.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 980.
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‘inadvertent.’”39 The court then held that a party cannot rely on its own
negligence to avoid a finding of waiver:
The courts will grant no greater protection to those who
assert the privilege than their own precautions warrant. We
therefore agree with those courts which have held that the
privilege is lost “‘even if the disclosure is inadvertent . . .
.’” To hold, as we do, that an inadvertent disclosure will
waive the privilege imposes a self-governing restraint on
the freedom with which organizations such as corporations,
unions, and the like label documents related to
communications with counsel as privileged . . . . In other
words, if a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it must
treat the confidentiality of attorney-client communications
like jewels – if not crown jewels. Short of court-compelled
disclosure, or other equally extraordinary circumstances,
we will not distinguish between various degrees of
“voluntariness” in waivers of the attorney-client privilege.40
[11] In International Digital Systems Corporation v. Digital Equipment
Corporation,41 the court relied on the first rationale for the strict liability
rule – that disclosure destroys the confidentiality of the formerly
privileged communication. In that case, the plaintiff reviewed 500,000
documents in response to discovery, including two separate reviews to
identify privileged communications.42
Nevertheless, the plaintiff
inadvertently produced twenty privileged documents to the defendant and
subsequently sought an order to compel their return.43 Although the court
critiqued the privilege review process in detail, ultimately concluding that
the “Post-It” notes that were used to identify the privileged materials were
either never affixed to the subject documents, mistakenly removed, or
simply overlooked, it stated emphatically that it was not relying on any
deficiencies in the review process in concluding that the privilege had
been waived.44 As the court explained:
39

Id.
Id. (quoting In re Grand-Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1984).
41
Int’l Digital Sys. Corp., 120 F.R.D. at 445.
42
Id. at 446-447.
43
Id. at 446.
44
Id. at 448-449.
40
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I see little benefit to doing a painstaking evaluation of the
precautions taken by plaintiff’s counsel when it is noted
that the whole basis for the privilege is to maintain the
confidentiality of the document. It cannot be doubted that
the confidentiality of the document has been destroyed by
the ‘inadvertent’ disclosure no less than if the disclosure
had been purposeful; it equally cannot be doubted that the
confidentiality of the communication can never be restored,
regardless of whether the disclosure was ‘inadvertent’ or
purposeful. In other words, regardless of how painstaking
the precautions, there is no order I can enter which erases
from defendant’s counsel’s knowledge what has been
disclosed. There is no order which can remedy what has
occurred, regardless of whether or not the precautions were
sufficient.45
[12] The beauty of the strict liability approach is its simplicity – all that
needs be determined is the fact of disclosure. All else is irrelevant to the
inquiry. The per se rule is also the approach that best serves the
underlying purpose of discovery, full disclosure in the search for the truth,
and provides the greatest incentive “for attorneys to take due care with
their client’s documents.”46 From the producing party’s perspective,
however, the strict liability approach is obviously the most restrictive of
the privilege, and some courts view it as “too harsh in light of the vast
volume of documents disclosed in modern litigation.”47
B. INTENT-REQUIRED
[13] The opposite extreme of the per se approach is the view that
privilege can only intentionally be waived. Under the rationale that a
waiver, by definition, involves the intentional relinquishment of a known
right, a minority of courts have held that “there must have been some
45

Id. at 449 (emphasis in original).
Daniel, supra note 18, at 675.
47
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 481 (E.D.
Va. 1991). See also Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 658 (arguing that the strict liability
approach is inflexible, will “foster and condone sharp practice,” and “ignores the purpose
behind the privilege – encouraging full disclosure with an attorney – for the sake of
punishing accidental and technical disclosures”).
46
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intent by the party involved to make the disclosure before there can be a
waiver.”48 Because the privilege belongs to the client and not the attorney,
the inadvertent disclosure by the attorney cannot possibly be imputed to
the client who did not know of, and therefore could not have authorized,
the disclosure.49
[14] The intent-required approach was adopted by the court in
Transportation Equip. Sales Corp. v. BMY Wheeled Vehicles.50 The
defendant in that case had produced in discovery two copies of a
privileged letter, one redacted and one original, and sought an order
requiring the return of the unredacted version.51 The court found there
could be “no contention that the document's disclosure was in any way
willful, or resulted from anything other than oversight and mistake on the
part of defendant's counsel.”52 Acknowledging that there were cases in
other jurisdictions that had applied the strict liability approach, the court
held the disadvantages of that approach outweighed its benefits:
This waiver approach has the virtues of simplicity and ease
of application. Weighing against those virtues – and they
are the only virtues that I can perceive – is the likelihood
that this approach will foster and condone sharp practice,
distrust, and animosity among lawyers – none of which
does anything to accomplish justice fairly and
expeditiously. In addition, such approach encourages, in the

48

Hundley, supra note 2, at § 4a.
Id. Some have identified Dean Wigmore as a staunch advocate of the strict liability
rule, based on his criticism of the intent-required approach on the grounds that a
“privileged person would seldom be found to waive, if his intention not to abandon could
alone control the situation.” 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2327 (1961).
Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, given the rampant inconsistency in the
jurisprudence, Wigmore can also be cited in favor of the intent-required approach, as
with his comment that communications “made in confidence by the client are at his
instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor except
the protection be waived.” Id. at § 2292.
50
Transp. Equip. Sales Corp. v. BMY Wheeled Vehicles, 930 F. Supp. 1187, 1188 (N.D.
Ohio 1996).
51
Id. at 1187.
52
Id.
49
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party to whom inadvertent disclosure is made, incaution
where care should be taken.53
The court then adopted the position taken by the American Bar
Association (ABA) Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
in its now withdrawn Formal Opinion 92-368, which required the recipient
of an inadvertently produced privileged communication to “‘refrain from
examining the materials, notify the sending lawyer and abide by the
instructions of the lawyer who sent them.’”54
C. MULTI-FACTOR ANALYSIS
[15] Between these two extreme positions lies the majority rule, which
requires a case-by-case, multi-factor analysis to determine if an
inadvertent disclosure waives the privilege.55 This approach attempts to
strike a balance between protecting the client who intended that her
communications remain confidential, and “not reliev[ing] those claiming
the privilege of the consequences of their carelessness if the circumstances
surrounding the disclosure do not clearly demonstrate that continued
protection is warranted.”56 The court will consider several factors in
determining whether an inadvertent disclosure should waive the privilege:
(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken by the party to prevent
disclosure; (2) any delay between the disclosure and the attempt to rectify
the error; (3) the scope of discovery; (4) the extent of the inadvertent
disclosure, including the relative volume of privileged information
disclosed compared to the total volume of information produced; and (5)
any overriding issues of fairness, including whether the receiving party
has relied on the information produced.57
53

Id. at 1187-88.
Id. at 1188 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Form Op. 368
(1992) (“Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Materials”)).
55
Daniel, supra note 18, at 679-80. See also, Hundley, supra note 2, at § 5.
56
Stevenson, supra note 34, at 362 (quoting Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425,
1434 (5th Cir. 1993)).
57
See Hundley, supra, note 2, at § 5. Some courts applying the multi-factor test purport
to apply a four-factor test, excluding the scope of discovery as a factor. See, e.g., Atronic
Int’l GMBH v. SAI Semispecialists of America, Inc., 232 F.R.D. 160, 164 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (balancing ““(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken by the producing party
to prevent inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents; (2) the volume of discovery
versus the extent of the specific disclosure issue; (3) the length of time taken by the
54
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[16] Perhaps the first case involving the production of a large number of
documents to recognize the need to consider more factors than simply the
fact of disclosure and the producing party’s intent was Transamerica
Computer v. International Business Machines.58 In that case, the plaintiff
sought to compel production of certain allegedly privileged materials59
that the defendant, International Business Machines (IBM), had
inadvertently produced in a prior antitrust lawsuit.60 Acknowledging the
case law on both the strict liability and intent-required tests, the court
examined in detail the circumstances under which the disclosure had been
made and held that, under those circumstances, any applicable privilege
had not been waived.61
[17] Specifically, the court found that (1) IBM had been ordered to
complete its production of approximately 17 million pages of documents
in only three months (scope of production) 62; (2) that “IBM mounted a
producing party to rectify the disclosure; and (4) the overarching issue of fairness”).
However, in many cases, such as Atronic, in which the disclosures were made as part of
mandatory disclosures under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B), the scope of discovery is not an
issue. It is also apparent that some courts confuse the “scope” of discovery with the
volume of information produced compared to the number of privileged documents. See,
e.g., Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone Star Indus., 132 F.R.D. 558, 560 (D. Kan. 1990) (
“The scope of discovery undertaken in this case also leads us to conclude that a finding of
waiver would be inappropriate. More than 9,000 pages of documents were produced, and
the documents in question were only eight pages contained in one of 118 personnel files
produced.”) The fact that courts articulate and apply the five standards with considerable
variation further argues for a definitive standard.
58
Transamerica Computer v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978).
59
The Ninth Circuit assumed for purposes of its analysis that the documents in question
were privileged and addressed only the issue of waiver. It noted that, having determined
that there was no waiver, the district court would have to determine whether each of the
documents in question was actually privileged. Id. at 647 n.2.
60
Id. at 646-47.
61
The court relied, at least in part, on the principle “that a party does not waive the
attorney-client privilege for documents which he is compelled to produce.” Id. at 651.
Based on its review of the circumstances, the court held that IBM had effectively been
compelled to produce the subject documents. Id. at 651-52. In addition, the court found
it significant that the trial judge in the prior litigation had entered an order specifically
holding that IBM had not waived its privilege with respect to any inadvertently produced
documents. Id. at 649-50. Nonetheless, the court also noted that its “conclusion that
IBM did not waive its claim to its privilege . . . [was] based on [its] independent analysis
of the circumstances surrounding IBM’s inadvertent production.” Id. at 652.
62
Id. at 648.
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herculean [sic] effort to review and produce the materials,” including a
review of “each and every one of the 17 million pages” (reasonableness of
precautions) 63; (3) that IBM realized shortly after the screening process
began that “privileged documents were evading detection by its
reviewers” and undertook remedial action, which included a special
review of any documents selected by the plaintiff for production to
identify any privileged materials and withhold them from the final
production (delay in identifying and attempting to rectify the error) 64; and
(4) that “a relatively small number, 1138 (approximately 5800 pages), of
supposedly privileged documents were inadvertently produced” to the
plaintiff (extent of disclosure).65 Thus, although it did not articulate them
individually as have courts in more recent decisions, the Transamerica
court considered all five of the factors that subsequent courts have
considered in applying the multi-factor test.66

63

Id.
Id. at 649-50. The element of delay is one that has generated significant variation in
the case law. Compare Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 183 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) (finding that “[w]hile plaintiffs acted to recover [the document] as soon as
they found it had been inadvertently produced, this was not until six weeks after
production”) (emphasis in original), with Premiere Digital Access, Inc. v. Cent. Tel. Co.,
360 F. Supp.2d 1168, 1171-1176 (D. Nev. 2005) (finding no waiver of privilege for a
document that had been produced in Rule 26 disclosures where the disclosure was not
discovered until nearly one year later). Most cases hold that the relevant time period for
evaluating the producing party’s diligence begins once the party discovers, or reasonably
should have discovered, the disclosure, rather than at the time of the disclosure itself.
See, e.g., Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 574, 577 (D. Kan. 1997) (“[t]he relevant time
for rectifying any error begins when a party discovered or with reasonable diligence
should have discovered the inadvertent disclosure”) (citing Kansas City Power & Light
Co. v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 172 (1989)); Aramony v.
United Way of America, 969 F. Supp. 226, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The period after the
producing party realizes that privileged information has been disclosed is the relevant
period for measuring whether the privilege has been waived”) (citing Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 Civ. 5125, 1995 WL 117871, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 20, 1995) (citing Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 392,
400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)).
65
Transamerica Compuer Co., 573 F.2d at 648-50.
66
The application of the fifth factor, overriding interests of fairness, includes its
recognition that IBM was operating under a very tight schedule in circumstances that
amounted to a compelled production of documents. Id. at 651.
64
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[18] A more recent case specifically considering each of the five factors is
United States v. Keystone Sanitation Company.67 There one group of
defendants in a Superfund action, the “Generator Defendants,” sought the
billing records of the attorneys for another group of defendants, the
“Keystone Defendants,” to show that the latter had been disposing of
assets to avoid paying their share of any ultimate liability.68 The
Generator Defendants contended that any privilege that had attached to the
records had been waived when the Keystone Defendants produced two email messages from their attorneys on the same subject matter.69 The
Keystone Defendants, in turn, contended that the e-mail messages had
been inadvertently produced, and that the privilege should not, therefore,
be deemed waived.70
[19] Applying the multi-factor analysis, the court held first that the
Keystone Defendants failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent the
disclosure in light of the fact that the court had imposed no short deadlines
for the production, and had not been petitioned for additional time for
review.71 The court then found that the relative number of documents
produced was small (two documents from a large production), which
favored the Keystone Defendants, but that the extent of the disclosure was
complete in that the e-mail messages disclosed “precisely the type of
information sought from the billing and time statements,” which would
favor the Generator Defendants.72 Next, the court acknowledged that
there was no significant delay between the document production and the
Keystone Defendants’ attempt to rectify the disclosure, a factor that would
have supported upholding the privilege.73 Finally, the court held that the
overriding issue of fairness “weighs squarely in favor of waiver” because,
“[t]o preclude discovery as to whether principal potentially responsible
parties are or were engaged in the deliberate dissipation of assets for the
purpose of avoiding a share of liability . . . runs counter to the interests of
justice.”74
67

United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., 885 F. Supp. 672 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
Id. at 675.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 676.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
United States, supra note 67, at 676.
74
Id.
68
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[20] The multi-factor analysis, though fact-specific and therefore
susceptible to inconsistent results,75 is the only test that recognizes and
attempts to account for the tension between the confidentiality of a client’s
communications to her attorney and the truth-seeking purposes of liberal
discovery.76
D. SIGNIFICANT PART TEST
[21] Some state courts apply a fourth analysis, based on Cal. Evid. Code §
912(a), adopted in 1965, which provides that the privilege is waived if a
significant portion has been disclosed with the consent of the holder:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the right of
any person to claim a privilege [under various statutory
provisions, including the “lawyer-client privilege”] is
waived with respect to a communication protected by the
privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion,
has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has
consented to disclosure made by anyone. Consent to
disclosure is manifested by any statement or other conduct
of the holder of the privilege indicating consent to the
disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege in any
proceeding in which the holder has the legal standing and
opportunity to claim the privilege.77
A number of state courts have applied a “significant part” analysis to an
inadvertent disclosure with varying results.78
75

See Bruckner-Harvey, supra note 30, at 390.
Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 659 (“This discretionary test attempts to strike a balance
between the competing interests of encouraging complete disclosure of facts to attorneys
and requiring that the confidences involved in privileged communication be carefully
guarded”).
77
CAL. EVID. CODE § 912(a) (West 2005).
78
Hundley, supra note 2, at § 6(a). Although many federal courts consider the extent of
the disclosure in the multi-factor analysis, “few of the federal courts have adopted the
‘significant part’ reasoning in the sense that California arguably has.” However, at least
one federal court appears to have adopted a “significant part” analysis based on the
proposed Fed. R. Evid. 5-11, which was later rejected by Congress. See id. (citing
Champion Int’l Corp. v. Int’l Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Ga. 1980)).
76
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E. THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAIVER
[22] Also important to consider is the scope of waiver potentially effected
by an inadvertent disclosure. A waiver of privilege as a result of the
inadvertent disclosure of one document may extend vertically, meaning
that the privilege is waived as to the entire world, and horizontally,
meaning that the waiver may extend to additional documents and
information.79 Although a detailed analysis of this topic is beyond the
scope of this article, it is important for present purposes to recognize that
there is a great deal of variation in both the standards applied and the
results achieved.
[23] Generally speaking, courts will apply one of three standards: subject
matter waiver, limited waiver, or no waiver.80 Courts applying subject
matter waiver hold that the privilege is waived not only for the specific
communication that was disclosed, but for all documents and
communications on the same subject matter.81 Courts applying the limited
waiver standard will hold that the privilege is waived only for the specific
communication that was disclosed.82 Some courts will find that there is no
waiver at all when the privileged documents are disclosed inadvertently.83
Unfortunately the standards are applied inconsistently, depending on the
79

Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 661.
Hundley, supra note 2, at §§ 7-10.
81
See, e.g., Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Dept. of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883-84
(1st Cir. 1995) (“a waiver premised on inadvertent disclosure will be deemed to
encompass ‘all other such communications on the same subject.’”) (quoting Weil v.
Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981)). See also
Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 662 (noting that subject matter waiver may be interpreted
broadly or narrowly, depending on the circumstances).
82
See, e.g., Koch Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry Seal, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 109, 120 (D.N.J
2002) (holding that ‘“[t]he general rule that a disclosure waives not only the specific
communication but also the subject matter of it in other communications is not
appropriate in the case of inadvertent disclosure, unless it is obvious that a party is
attempting to gain an advantage or make offensive or unfair use of the disclosure’”)
(quoting Parkway Gallery Furniture v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, 116 F.R.D.
46, 52 (M.D.N.C. 1987)).
83
See, e.g., Maldonado v. Admin. Office of the Courts-Prob. Div., 225 F.R.D. 120, 12932 (D.N.J. 2004) (applying multi-factor analysis to find no waiver even where disclosure
was complete, the privileged information having appeared in an amended complaint,
because the producing party “took reasonable precautions to avoid disclosure of the
[privileged] letter”).
80
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circumstances. For example, courts will construe the scope of the “subject
matter” more narrowly or broadly depending on a variety of factors.84 As
a result, it is perhaps more profitable to consider the factors that courts
will consider than the standards themselves.
[24] Among the factors that courts have relied upon in determining the
scope of waiver are the following: (1) potential prejudice to the privilegeholder’s adversary; (2) the extent to which the privilege-holder has
selectively disclosed information for strategic purposes; (3) the extent to
which the privilege-holder has cooperated with, or frustrated, the
discovery process; (4) whether the disclosure was intentional or
inadvertent; and (5) the care with which the privilege-holder managed its
confidential communications.85 Not surprisingly, some of these factors
are the same as those applied to determine whether the privilege has been
waived at all under the multi-factor analysis, and with the same results:
increased culpability on the part of the privilege-holder generally will
result in an increased scope of waiver.86 Thus, the dilemma remains for
the attorney charged with production of the increasingly large volumes of
electronically-stored information.
F. A LACK OF GUIDANCE
[25] As suggested above, the standards applied by the courts in
determining whether there has been a waiver when privileged
communications are inadvertently disclosed, and, if so, the extent of the
waiver, are inconsistent and inconsistently applied – both at the federal
and state levels. A number of analyses have been undertaken attempting
to identify the approach adopted by the various federal and state courts,

84

Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 661-62. See also Hundley, supra note 2, at § 8 n.54
(noting that “courts from virtually all of the circuits” have applied all three of the scope
of waiver standards, “suggesting that, although the courts often speak in terms of an
absolute rule, the circumstances of the particular case often determine the result that will
be reached”).
85
Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 662.
86
Compare Hundley, supra note 2, at § 7 (“in general it is apparent that courts do not like
applying subject matter waiver where the initial disclosure has been a mistake”) with
Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 674-75 (arguing that courts apply the various standards
inconsistently and arbitrarily).
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not surprisingly with somewhat inconsistent results.87 The following
charts are based on the analysis performed by Hundley in Waiver of
Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure – Federal Law88 and
Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure – State Law89
and include courts that have adopted the referenced approach either
expressly or by implication:

87

Compare Hundley, supra note 2, and Hundley, supra note 7, with Harding supra, note

2.
88
89

Hundley, supra note 2.
Hundley, supra note 2.

19

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XII, Issue 4

FEDERAL COURTS BY CIRCUIT
Strict Liability
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth

Intent-Required
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth

Tenth

Tenth
Eleventh
D.C.
Federal

D.C.
Federal

Seventh

20

Multi-Factor
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
D.C.
Federal

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XII, Issue 4

STATE COURTS
Strict Liability
California
Connecticut
Florida
Georgia
Illinois

IntentRequired
California

Multi-Factor
California
Connecticut
Delaware

Illinois

Significant
Part
California
Delaware

Illinois
Indiana
Kansas

Kansas
Michigan
Missouri

Montana
Nebraska

Nebraska
New Mexico

New Jersey
New York
North
Carolina

New Jersey
New York

New York

New York

North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon

Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South
Carolina

South Dakota
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
Washington

21

Texas

Texas

Virginia

Virginia

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XII, Issue 4

As is readily evident, litigants are often at a loss to predict with any degree
of certainty the standard that will be applied to an inadvertent disclosure of
privileged information.
[26] For example, courts in the Second Circuit have applied all three
standards in cases involving disclosure of attorney-client information. In
re Horowitz involved a federal grand jury subpoena duces tecum issued
for the contents of three file cabinets in the possession of an accountant.90
The owners of the documents moved to quash the subpoena on the
grounds that, among other things, certain of the documents were
privileged attorney-client communications.91
The court concluded,
however, that any privilege that had attached to the documents had been
waived when the owners gave their accountant unrestricted access to the
documents for purposes unrelated to obtaining legal advice.92
[27] In contrast, the court in Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields93
applied the intent-required test. Connecticut Mutual was an action by
certain bond holders against the bond underwriter for misrepresentation.94
In a motion to compel answers to certain questions posed at the
deposition, the defendant contended that some of the questions called for
privileged information, while the plaintiffs argued that any privilege had
been waived because the defendant had disclosed certain letters that
contained the same information sought in the deposition. The court,
however, held that “to support a finding of waiver, there must be evidence
that [the defendant] intended to waive” the privilege. 95 Because the letters
had been inadvertently disclosed, there was no waiver.96
[28] Finally, in SEC v. Cassano,97 the court applied the multi-factor test to
find a waiver. During the course of discovery, the SEC made available to

90

In re Horowitz 482 F.2d 72, 72-75 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
Id. at 75.
92
Id. at 80-82 (“[i]t is not asking too much to insist that if a client wishes to preserve the
privilege . . . , he must take some affirmative action to preserve confidentiality”).
93
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y 1955).
94
Id. at 450.
95
Id. at 451.
96
Id.
97
SEC v. Cassano, 189 F.R.D. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
91
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the defendants between 50 and 52 boxes of documents for inspection.98
Early in the review, attorneys for the defendants discovered a 100 page
memorandum prepared by SEC staff attorneys.99 The defendants
requested that a copy be made immediately, prior to the copying and
production of any other documents selected during the review, and an SEC
attorney agreed without first reviewing or even identifying the
document.100 After confirming that the document did not appear on the
privilege log, counsel for the defendants distributed the document to his
colleagues and clients. Twelve days later, the SEC realized that the
document had been produced and moved for its return.101 The court held
that the privilege had been waived because the SEC failed to take adequate
steps to protect the document, including failing to ensure that it was not
privileged when the defendants requested specifically that it be copied.102
Moreover, although the SEC moved promptly to recover the document
after discovering it had been produced, the defendants had already widely
distributed the document, and fairness dictated that the court not disregard
SEC’s carelessness.103
IV. A PROBLEM UNRESOLVED
[29] Inadvertent disclosure of privileged information is not a new issue,
and the particular problems associated with electronically-stored
information have been recognized and addressed – to the extent they can
be – in procedural rules, ethics rules and discovery standards. None,
however, resolve the underlying conflict with the substantive law.
A. THE FEDERAL RULES
[30] The Judicial Conference Committee
Procedure (Judicial Conference) approved a
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “aimed at
stored information.”104 Recognizing the
98

Id. at 84.
Id. at 83-84.
100
Id. at 84-85.
101
Id. at 85.
102
Id. at 85-86.
103
SEC, supra note 97, at 86.
104
Judicial Conference Report, supra note 6, at 22.
99
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privileged information will be inadvertently disclosed as discovery of
electronically stored information becomes more common, the Committee
approved amendments to Rules 16 and 26 in an effort to deal with the
problem:
The problems that can result from efforts to guard against
privilege waiver often become more acute when discovery
of electronically stored information is sought. The volume
of the information and the forms in which it is stored may
make privilege determinations more difficult and privilege
review correspondingly more expensive and timeconsuming, yet less likely to detect all privileged
information. Inadvertent production is increasingly likely
to occur. Because the failure to screen out even one
privileged item may result in an argument that there has
been a waiver as to all other privileged materials related to
the same subject matter, early attention to this problem is
more important as electronic discovery becomes more
common.105
Specifically, “[u]nder the proposed amendments to Rules 26(f) and 16, if
the parties are able to reach an agreement to adopt protocols for asserting
privilege and work-product protection claims that will facilitate discovery
that is faster and at lower cost, they may ask the court to include such
arrangements in a case-management or other order.”106
[31] In addition, the Committee also approved an amendment to Rule
26(b)(5) to create “a procedure for asserting privilege after production that
is parallel to the similar proposals for Rules 16 and 26(f).”107 Because
“inadvertent production of privileged or protected material is a substantial
risk,” the “proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(5) clarifies the procedure to
apply when a responding party asserts a claim of privilege or of workproduct protection after production.”108 The new procedure requires the
party that has inadvertently produced privileged information to notify the
105

Id. at 27.
Id.
107
Id. at 29.
108
Id.
106
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receiving party of its privilege claim as well as the basis for it.109 Upon
receiving notice, the receiving party will be required to “return, sequester,
or destroy the information, and may not use it or disclose it to third parties
until the claim is resolved.”110 Moreover, if the receiving party has
already disclosed the information to a third party, it will be required to
take reasonable steps to get it back.111 The rule will also give the
receiving party the option of submitting the allegedly privileged materials
to the court to determine if the information was, in fact, privileged, and if
so, whether the privilege had been waived.112
[32] In approving the amendments, the Committee cautions repeatedly
that the new rules will not protect a party from the substantive law
regarding waiver if it conflicts with the approved procedures.113 Thus,
the “proposed amendment [to Rule 26(b)(5)] does not address the
substantive questions whether privilege or work product protection has
been waived or forfeited.”114 In fact, the Committee revised the proposed
amendments to Rule 26(b)(5) twice to avoid any apparent conflict with
substantive waiver law. First, the Committee rejected a prior version of
the amendment that required the producing party to notify the receiving
party within a reasonable time because of its potential conflict with
substantive waiver law.115 Second, the version of the rule published for
109

Id.
Judicial Conference Report, supra note 6, at 29.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
See, e.g., id. (stating that the proposed rules do “not attempt to change the rules that
determine whether production waives the privilege or protection asserted”). Indeed, the
Committee takes pains to make clear that it did not intend to “trigger the special statutory
process for adopting rules that modify privilege.” Id. at 29-30.
114
Judicial Conference Report, supra note 6, at Rules App. C-54.
115
Id. at C-55 (“Under the law of many jurisdictions, whether a party asserted a privilege
claim within a reasonable time is important to determining whether there is a waiver;
focusing on a reasonable time might carry implications inconsistent with the Committee’s
intent to avoid the substantive law of privilege and privilege waiver.”) This revision
apparently contributed to four Committee members voting against the amendment to
Rule 26(b)(5) because of their fear that “the new procedure could be used to disrupt
litigation, particularly if the claim of privilege or work-product was made late in the
case.” Judicial Conference Report, supra note 6, at 30. The majority, however, “did not
share the concern that parties would deliberately delay a claim of privilege or work
product because to do so might waive the protection under the applicable substantive
law.” Id. at 29-30.
110
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public comment referred to situations in which information had been
produced “without intending to waive a claim of privilege.”116 That
provision was removed “because many courts include intent in the
factors that determine whether production waives privilege.”117 Thus,
while the amended rules, if adopted, will embody a well-constructed
procedure for resolving claims of inadvertent production, they do nothing
to protect the privilege in jurisdictions where the substantive law would
result in waiver.
B. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS
[33] The American Bar Association (ABA) also has recently published
or revised a number of documents in part to address the problem of
inadvertent disclosure, including the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Model Rules), Civil Discovery Standards, and Formal Opinions
of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility.
1. THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND FORMAL ETHICS
OPINIONS
[34] Prior to 2003 the ABA, through its Formal Opinion 92-368, required
that attorney recipients of inadvertently disclosed privileged or otherwise
confidential information “refrain from examining the materials, notify the
sending lawyer and abide the instructions of the lawyer who sent them.”118
On October 1, 2005, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility retreated from that position because the former
opinion conflicted with the amended Rule 4.4 of the Model Rules.119 The
new ABA Formal Opinion 05-437 only requires the recipient to “promptly
notify the sender in order to permit the sender to take protective
measures.”120 Whether a waiver results from the inadvertent disclosure is
“a matter of law beyond the scope” of the ABA ethics opinions.121
116

Judicial Conference Report, supra note 6, at Rules App. C-60.
Id.
118
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005)
(“Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Materials: Withdrawal of Formal Opinion 92368” (November 10, 1992)).
119
Id. at 1.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 2 (quoting Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.4.4, cmt. 2 (2002)).
117
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[35] The action that spurred this retreat occurred in February 2002 when
the ABA amended Model Rule 4.4 to add Rule 4.4(b) which states, “[a]
lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the
lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document
was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”122 Comment 2
to Rule 4.4 explains:
Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive
documents that were mistakenly sent or produced by
opposing parties or their lawyers. If a lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that such a document was sent
inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to
promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to
take protective measures. Whether the lawyer is required
to take additional steps, such as returning the original
document, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these
Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of
a document has been waived.123
[36] Thus, not only does the ABA acknowledge the inefficacy of the
Model Rules in overcoming a finding of waiver under the substantive
law, the ABA has actually retreated from imposing on attorneys ethical
obligations that would, in some cases, exceed the responsibilities
imposed by the substantive law. The end result is that, even in
jurisdictions where waiver is not automatic upon disclosure, the receiving
attorney is no longer under an ethical duty to refrain from reading the
privileged information pending a resolution of the waiver issue. Thus,
there would truly be no way to “seal the bag” because the cat will already
have escaped.124

122

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.4(b) (2002).
Id. at 4.4(b)(2) (emphasis added).
124
Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
123
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2. CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS
[37] In 1999 the ABA adopted its Civil Discovery Standards.125 The
standards were revised in 2004 to incorporate “changes relating to
electronic discovery.”126 Among other things, the ABA added standards
for “Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information,”127 and “AttorneyClient Privilege and Attorney Work Product,”128 in an attempt to provide
guidance to litigants and courts on how best to handle the problem of
inevitable inadvertent disclosure. According to Standard 28, “parties
should consider stipulating in advance that the inadvertent disclosure of
privileged information ordinarily should not be deemed a waiver of that
information or any information that may be derived from it.”129 In
essence, the ABA has advocated that parties stipulate to a somewhat
ambiguous form of the intent-required approach, in that inadvertent
disclosure would not “ordinarily” result in waiver. Unfortunately, the
commentary does not provide any guidance as to what would be out of the
ordinary.
More importantly, however, is the recognition in the
commentary that the “law among various jurisdictions differs on the effect
of an inadvertent production of privileged communications.”130
[38] This point is brought home even more clearly in Standard 32, which
suggests that parties stipulate to the methods of extracting and reviewing
electronic information to ostensibly avoid waiver of privileged
information.131 Combining both “claw back” and “quick peek” options,132
the standard also expressly recognizes that the parties to such a stipulation
“should consider the potential impact that it may have on the producing
125

Civil Discovery Standards, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG., available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/discoverystandards/ (2004).
126
Id. at 56.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 56.
129
Id..
130
Id.
131
Civil Discovery Standards, supra note 125, at 71.
132
A “claw back” agreement would allow the producing party to demand the return of an
inadvertently produced privileged document without waiver of the privilege. Under a
“quick peek” agreement, on the other hand, the receiving party would be allowed to
inspect the documents of the producing party to identify those that it would like to have
produced, which the producing party would then review for privilege. See Daniel, supra
note 18.
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party’s ability to maintain privilege or work-product protection attaching
to any such data if subsequently demanded by non-parties.”133 Indeed, the
commentary goes on to admit that “there is no assurance that a stipulated
order providing that inadvertent production does not effect a waiver will
be effective against a claim of waiver by a third party.”134 In other words,
absent a change to the substantive law, the ABA standards are, in many
jurisdictions, aspirational only.
V. A PLEA FOR GUIDANCE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
[39] Inadvertent disclosure of privileged information is inevitable,
particularly in light of the ever-increasing volumes of information that will
be exchanging hands as discovery of electronically stored information
becomes commonplace. Yet, despite efforts by the Judicial Conference to
provide a uniform and rational procedure for dealing with inadvertent
disclosure, litigants are left to guess at the standard that will be applied in
any particular case and often even in a single jurisdiction. Worse, the
ABA’s retreat from the ethical duty that would have at least required
attorneys to refrain from reading and disseminating an inadvertently
produced privileged communication until a court decides the waiver issue
will ultimately undermine the producing party’s position in those
jurisdictions in which the extent of the disclosure is a factor. To restore
the balance between facilitating full disclosure and protecting the
communications between a client and her attorney, while recognizing the
reality of modern discovery of electronically stored information and
ensuring accountability and responsibility in the attorneys involved in the
process, I recommend (1) a uniform standard to be applied by state and
federal courts in the event of an inadvertent disclosure of privileged
information, and (2) a modification to Model Rule 4.4(b) to ensure that
court’s decisions are based on the conduct of the privilege owner rather
than third parties.
[40] State and federal courts should adopt the multi-factor standard when
evaluating whether an inadvertent disclosure results in a waiver of the
privilege. Although the multi-factor test has been criticized on the
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grounds that it is likely to lead to inconsistent results,135 it is the only test
that can be rationally applied given the realities of modern discovery of
electronically-stored information. The strict liability test ignores the
reality of the coming flood of data in modern discovery. Even the most
diligent attorneys will be unable to ensure with certainty that privileged
information will not be disclosed to third parties. To sanction the
privilege-holder even after the most thorough and painstaking effort to
preserve her privilege is to unduly minimize the importance of, and create
a chilling effect on, confidential communications in the attorney-client
relationship. While the per se approach has been lauded for creating a
“strong incentive for careful document management during the course of
discovery,”136 the draconian results that will ensue from the inevitable
inadvertent disclosures associated with discovery of electronically-stored
information, even with the most meticulous review processes, create a
strong argument for the multi-factor analysis.137
[41] Likewise, the intent-required approach places absolutely no
responsibility on the privilege-holder or her attorney to protect the
confidentiality of their communications and thus tips the scale too far in
the other direction. Litigants and their attorneys should be held
accountable for making reasonable efforts to protect the confidentiality of
their communications. To hold otherwise would unduly minimize the
importance of full disclosure in our modern, discovery-driven system of
litigation.
[42] Therefore, only the multi-factor analysis allows a court to consider
the facts and circumstances of each case, including the privilege-holder’s
diligence in protecting her own interests, before determining whether an
inadvertent disclosure results in a waiver.138 However, the multi-factor
135
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test alone will not resolve the present problem because attorneys are
currently not ethically obligated to respect a potential privilege until its
status is judicially determined. Therefore, Model Rule 4.4(b) should be
revised to impose on recipients of such information a duty not to interfere
with or undermine the judicial determination.
[43] Specifically, Model Rule 4.4(b) should require that an attorney that
receives potentially privileged information that she knows, or reasonably
should know, was inadvertently disclosed, refrain from reviewing the
information or disclosing it to anyone, including her client, pending a
judicial determination of the status of the privilege. This will ensure that
the court reviewing the circumstances of the disclosure will base its
decision on the actions of the producing party rather than on the actions of
the receiving party, consistent with the long-standing principle that only
the owner can waive the privilege.
[44] A uniform standard for determining the status of inadvertently
disclosed privileged information in light of the conduct of the producing
party, and an ethical rule placing more responsibility on the receiving
attorney consistent with the importance of attorney-client
communications, will best balance the interests of each as they face the
coming onslaught of information in the electronic age of litigation.

there is no need to consider the issue before then; (2) the non-producing party will
probably already have reviewed the document in question, which is the primary concern
of the time element; and (3) “if the non-waiver presumption can be rebutted, it is because
of an inadequacy in the manner in which the attorney produced the document(s) in the
first place and not for how long the document(s) remained in the non-producing party’s
possession.” Id. at 488. Each of these arguments fails scrutiny. First, there is no reason
to wait and resolve the status of a privilege until trial. Indeed, any delay furthers the
potential for unwarranted dissemination of the potentially privileged information,
potentially undermining the privilege-holder’s interest in the confidential communication.
Second, as noted infra, I believe that attorneys should be ethically bound to refrain from
reviewing inadvertently disclosed information until the status of the privileged is
judicially determined. To cynically assume that the receiving party would read the
privileged information places far too little trust in, and accountability on, the attorney in
question. Finally, the non-waiver presumption can, indeed, be rebutted by a lack of
diligence in seeking to recover the disclosed information. Delay indicates a lack of
concern for the confidential information, or strategic decision-making, either of which
undermines the party’s stated interest in maintaining the privilege.
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